Challenges in adapting ECH in TLS for privacy enhancement over the Internet

Security and Privacy are crucial in modern Internet services. Transport Layer Security (TLS) has largely addressed the issue of security. However, information about the type of service being accessed goes in plain-text in the initial handshakes of vanilla TLS, thus potentially revealing the activity of users and compromising privacy. The "Encrypted ClientHello" or ECH overcomes this issue by extending TLS 1.3 where all of the information that can potentially reveal the service type is masked, thus addressing the privacy issues in TLS 1.3. However, we notice that Internet services tend to use different versions of TLS for application data (primary connection/channel) and supporting data (side channels) such as scheduling information \textit{etc.}. %, during the active session. Although many internet services have migrated to TLS 1.3, we notice that it is only true for the primary connections which do benefit from TLS 1.3, while the side-channels continue to use lower version of TLS (e.g., 1.2) %which do not support ECH and continue to leak type of service accessed. We demonstrate that privacy information leaked from the side-channels can be used to affect the performance on the primary channels, like blocking or throttling specific service on the internet. Our work demonstrates that adapting ECH on primary channels alone is not sufficient to prevent the privacy leaks and attacks on primary channels. Further, we demonstrate that it is necessary for all of the associated side-channels also to migrate to TLS 1.3 and adapt ECH extension in order to offer complete privacy preservatio