Alouf-Heffetz, ShiriShiriAlouf-HeffetzInamdar, TanmayTanmayInamdarJain, PallaviPallaviJainMore, Yash HirenYash HirenMoreTalmon, NimrodNimrodTalmon2025-08-282025-08-282024-03-012331-8422https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.07558https://d8.irins.org/handle/IITG2025/19983In liquid democracy, agents can either vote directly or delegate their vote to a different agent of their choice. This results in a power structure in which certain agents possess more voting weight than others. As a result, it opens up certain possibilities of vote manipulation, including control and bribery, that do not exist in standard voting scenarios of direct democracy. Here we formalize a certain kind of election control -- in which an external agent may change certain delegation arcs -- and study the computational complexity of the corresponding combinatorial problem.en-USe-Printe-Print123456789/495